## APPEAL NO. 020340 FILED MARCH 21, 2002

This appeal arises pursuant to the	Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act).	. A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on
January 8, 2002. The hearing officer	r determined that the appellant's (claimant)
compensable injury on,	does not extend to and include a right knee
meniscus tear and/or a low back injury.	

The claimant has appealed, contending that the hearing officer's determination is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The respondent (carrier) responds that the decision should be affirmed.

## DECISION

We affirm the hearing officer's decision.

The hearing officer did not err in determining the claimant's extent of injury. Whether the claimant sustained the alleged injuries as a result of the work-related incident , was a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 000074, decided February 25, 2000. There was conflicting evidence presented with regard to this issue. No issue was presented at the CCH that the carrier had waived the right to dispute any aspect of a right knee injury. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence, including the medical evidence (Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ)). The hearing officer could disbelieve the claimant's testimony and infer from the evidence that the claimant's full extent of injuries did not result when he slipped from a truck on . The Appeals Panel has held that a fact finder is not bound by the testimony of a medical witness when the credibility of the testimony is manifestly dependent on the credibility of the information imparted to the witness by the claimant. Rowland v. Standard Fire Insurance Company, 489 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The hearing officer's determination is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly uniust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). In considering all the evidence in the record, we cannot agree that the findings of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. In re-King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

## CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY 800 BRAZOS AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.

	Susan M. Kelley Appeals Judge
CONCUR:	
Chris Cowan Appeals Judge	
Thomas A. Knapp Appeals Judge	